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Saint John’s Red Head Battery
A Forgotten Military Artifact
of Confederation
Roger Sarty, Marc Milner and Doug Knight

I

n the early 1860s, driven by the threat of war
with the United States, British army engineers
and local contractors built a coast artillery battery
on top of the red-coloured bluffs overlooking
the eastern approach to Saint John harbour.
It is broadly similar to earlier coastal batteries
that still exist at Halifax and Quebec City, but
on a more massive scale because artillery was
rapidly increasing in size and power during the
1860s. Other heavy batteries were constructed
at other Canadian ports during that decade, but
all were subsequently rebuilt with more modern
structures. Red Head Battery is the only surviving
example in the country.1 It was also the last
major defensive work built to guard the strategic
overland road from Saint John to the Canadian
interior, which was the only means of access from
the Atlantic to the interior in winter.
The battery recalls the danger of American
invasion of Britain’s North American colonies
that resulted from confrontations between Britain
and the United States during the American
Civil War. That menace provided a key impetus
for Canadian Confederation in 1867, and Red
Head Battery provides the closest association
of any site or building to the important military
origins of Confederation. Astonishingly, Red Head
Battery remains largely intact today, and except
for the ravages of weather and time, it has not
changed since the last workmen left in 1866.
Until recently, the site had been forgotten by
everyone except the local residents. It deserves
to be better known.
Red Head Battery was constructed in direct
response to the Trent affair of 1861. This was

the incident that brought Britain and the United
States closest to armed conflict during the Civil
War. On 8 November 1861, the US cruiser San
Jacinto seized two Confederate diplomats from
the British steamer Trent in international waters.
The American government did not rush to release
the prisoners, and the British immediately
dispatched the first of more than 11,000 troops
to reinforce their North American colonies. War
seemed imminent. The greatest danger was to
the province of Canada, the southern part of
present-day Ontario and Quebec, which was a
long way from the centres of British sea power at
Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Bermuda. However, it
could be easily reached by the huge armies that
the US federal government had mobilized. The
situation was all the more difficult for Britain and
her colonies because the Trent incident happened
at the very end of the navigation season on the
St. Lawrence River. Only the first steamships
speeding the troops from Britain were able to
reach Quebec in December before ice made the
passage impossible. With the river closed, the
British were forced to use the traditional winter
land route to Canada through New Brunswick.2
This connection to Quebec had been
significant to the French before 1763, and it
remained critically important to the British,
particularly after the secession of the American
colonies from the Empire in 1783. During the War
of 1812, thousands of troops had moved up the
Saint John and Madawaska rivers, across Lake
Temiscouata, and down the portage to Rivière
du Loup. After the war, the British fortified
and secured the route, although the so-called
Aroostook War of 1839 brought the US and
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Britain to the brink of war over British operation
of the route through “disputed” territory. Without
it, there was no effective way to communicate
with the isolated frontier settlements of Canada
from November to May. In 1861 the Trent affair
again highlighted the importance of the route.
Hasty preparations were made for steamships to
discharge troops at Saint John, New Brunswick.
From there they travelled by sleigh up the Saint
John River valley and on to Rivière du Loup,
which was the eastern terminus of the Grand
Trunk Railway. More than 6,800 troops made
this 309-mile trek between early January and
mid-March 1862.
The immediate danger of war had passed
as early as 26 December 1861, when the US
government finally released the Confederate

diplomats. None of the fundamental difficulties
created by Britain’s neutrality in the Civil War
had been resolved, however. The first priority of
the British commanders was to defend the sea
around the Maritime colonies, and control enemy
movements in adjacent waters. This was the role
of the Royal Navy, but it could not do this and also
guard the harbours. These had to be defended
by coastal batteries.
As troops began to move through Saint
John in January 1862, Lieutenant-Colonel S.
Westmacott, commanding the Royal Engineers
at Halifax, and Colonel A. Bern of the Royal
Artillery, inspected Saint John’s defences and
recommended significant improvements. The
permanent British garrison consisted of a few
hundred gunners and infantry, manning an
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outdated and inadequate system of coastal
batteries. Originally built during the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, these were
located at Lower Cove and on Partridge Island.
The Lower Cove guns, at the southern end of
the city, were located too far into the harbour to
be much use. Partridge Island was an exposed
position, about a mile and a half to seaward,
that was well positioned to guard the shipping
channel. The barren, rocky terrain of the island,
and the low embankments of the existing battery,
however, offered little protection against modern
long-range artillery firing explosive shells.
Westmacott and Bern concluded that, “St. John
and its Harbour may be practically considered
as defenceless.”3

The ideal fortress would protect Saint John
from enemy ships and landing forces from
Mispec Point on the east, to Sheldon Point on
the west, which are about 6,000 yards (5500
metres) apart. In 1862, this was well beyond the
2,000-yard (1800 metre) effective range of the
contemporary artillery. Bern and Westmacott
therefore recommended that new batteries should
be constructed at Red Head on the east, and
Negro Point on the west, where the approaches
narrowed to 3,000 yards, “a good front of defence
within practicable [artillery] range.” At each
position there should be “a substantial properlycovered earthwork battery for ten heavy guns
– namely – three 100 pr [pounder - the gun fired
a 100-pound (45-kilogram) projectile] Armstrong

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2007

The British were not interested in developing
Saint John as a major base: the imperial
dockyard and fortress at Halifax served that
purpose. Nevertheless, Saint John was the
seacoast terminus of the Grand Communications
Route with the interior. The port had to be well

defended or the province of Canada could be cut
off during the winter months. Also, if an enemy
could seize Saint John, it could be used as a base
for an overland thrust against Canada, or for
operations in the Bay of Fundy to cut off Halifax
from the rear.
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rushed ten of the latest artillery pieces, 100pounder Armstrong guns, to Halifax. These
were earmarked for Red Head, Negro Point and
Partridge Island in the event of hostilities.

Top: Partridge Island battery in the 1860s, showing the
low, thin earth banks that gave insufficient protection
against new explosive shells, and the outdated cast-iron,
solid-ball-firing smooth-bore guns that armed the Saint
John defences. (Hargrove Collection, Partridge Island Research

Project, kindly supplied by Harold Wright).

Above: The large Armstrong 100-pounder rifled breech
loading gun, “built-up” from tough wrought iron tubes, which
fired 45 kg conical explosive shells. This revolutionary new
weapon had just entered service in 1861, and the British
Army was prepared rapidly to install several at Red Head
if war broke out with the United States.

guns, and seven 68 prs of 95 cwt [the gun weighed
95 hundredweights - 10,640 lbs (4,836 kg), and
fired a 68-lb (31-kg) projectile] with Expense
Magazines, Small Stores and a defensible
barrack for 50 men with enclosure against a
sudden attack or coup de main.” Batteries at
the Red Head and Negro Point positions could
also cooperate effectively with Partridge Island.
Because the island was very exposed, Bern and
Westmacott recommended that the existing
weak earthwork should be replaced by “a strong
self defensible casemated work for two to 300
men…with a powerful armament of at least 30
heavy guns…”
At the height of the Trent crisis in December
1861, the British commander at Halifax
authorized the Saint John garrison to stockpile
timber and sandbags. These would be used to
construct temporary batteries at Red Head and
Negro Point (soon to be called Fort Dufferin) if war
broke out. Meanwhile, the British government

The Armstrong guns, later known as 7-inch
rifled breech loaders, were a radical departure
from the cast-iron, muzzle-loading, smooth-bore,
spherical-shot-firing guns that had been standard
for centuries. These massive new guns were
constructed from wrought-iron tubes, that were
shrunk around the basic barrel to give it greater
strength. Wrought iron was stronger than castiron. The interior of the bore was cut with rifling
(spiral grooves) that gave a spin to the cylindrical
projectile on firing. The spinning stabilized the
shell in flight, improving range and accuracy.
The breech was sealed by a heavy wrought iron
block that fitted into a slot in the rear part of the
barrel, and was locked in place by a large screw
mechanism. Experience quickly demonstrated
that the breech mechanism was too heavy and
complex, and the British soon reverted to muzzleloading, built-up wrought-iron rifled guns. The
Armstrong guns were therefore available for use
in the colonies.
These new designs and other major
developments in artillery were soon tested in the
American Civil War. They were part of the many
changes in military technology that included
the emergence of ironclad steam-powered
warships. In 1859, France produced La Gloire,
whose traditional wooden hull was covered with
iron plates. The British instantly responded by
launching the much larger HMS Warrior in 1860,
which was entirely built of iron. The first clash
of ironclad ships occurred just two years later
at Hampton Roads, Virginia. There, the CSS
Virginia, little more than a wooden steam-driven
battery protected by iron plates, engaged the USS
Monitor, a low-hulled iron warship mounting
two muzzle-loading guns in a revolving turret.
The battle between these ships was inconclusive,
but the damage inflicted by the Virginia on the
Union fleet before she was engaged by the Monitor
demonstrated the vulnerability of wooden
warships to these new weapons.4
The design of the batteries at Red Head and
Negro Point reflected this changing technology.
A large number of guns were needed at each
position, in order to provide the high volume of
fire necessary to engage a steam-powered vessel,
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which was not dependent on the wind and could
manoeuver at will. The large guns on the ship,
moreover, could deliver a heavy weight of high
explosive shells, which demanded a high level of
protection at the battery. Therefore, although the
general design of the new Saint John batteries
was similar to earlier works, the structures were
more massive and designed to absorb much
heavier punishment. The parapets, for example,
at the Lower Cove, were only eight feet (2.4
metres) thick, and the guns were mounted to fire
over the top. The parapets of the new batteries
would be thirty feet (9 metres) thick, rising
eight feet (2.4 metres) above the floor of the gun
positions. As a result, the guns were fired through
embrasures cut in the parapet, the faces of which
were reinforced with local stone and capped with
brick. This design presented only a small opening
to seaward, covering the crews during loading
and firing. Between each pair of guns would
be a heavily-built masonry “expense” magazine
for ammunition. This would be covered with
five feet (1.5 metres) of earth. These magazines
also created a protective wall, or “traverse,”
perpendicular to the parapet, to protect gun
crews against fire from a ship positioned to fire
shells up the length of the battery.
The British Army’s Royal Engineers had
great experience in constructing the empire’s

fortifications, and this was a standard design. The
Trent crisis was only one of a number of incidents
that highlighted the need to improve coastal
defences in Britain, Canada, the West Indies,
and elsewhere. Since the early 1840s, a series
of panics had resulted from fears that hostile
powers could use new technology, particularly
fast, steam-powered warships, to evade the Royal
Navy and attack the empire’s ports. Steamships
meant that the bombardment of coastal towns,
the landing of troops for raids, or even a full scale
invasion, could not be anticipated by the state of
wind, weather, or tide. Permanent shore defences
were now more important than ever. However,
it was physically – and financially – impossible
to fortify every port that might become a target.
Therefore, Westmacott and Bern’s detailed
strategic assessment was critically important.
It allowed the British commanders to decide if
Saint John needed improved defences, and how
much of their limited budget should be allocated
for this task.
Unlike Halifax, Quebec, or Bermuda, Saint
John was not a major base for British naval or
land forces. That placed the city in a category
similar to commercial ports in Great Britain,
for whose defence the British government
insisted on municipal assistance. Their logic
was that the defences helped to secure the local

Photo by Lee Ellen Pottie

The two central gun positions, looking north towards Courtenay Bay and the eastern suburbs of Saint John, showing
a side view of the northern expense magazine. The earth covering of the magazine had two purposes, to protect the
magazine, and also to create a traverse to prevent shells fired from a ship bearing out to sea to the south from “raking”
the whole length of the battery. The figures in the foreground are Marc Milner (left) and Lee Windsor (right).
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Progress drawing of the Red Head battery, signed by Lieutenant-Colonel S. Westmacott, Commanding Royal Engineers
at Halifax, dated 31 December 1863, and showing that no work had been undertaken on the four gun emplacements
planned for the left (southern) flank pending decisions resulting from the discovery the ground dropped away and made
for an exposed position.

economy, so commercial interests should help
to pay for the protection. This model was doubly
applicable to Saint John. Since the 1840s, the
British government had been pressing the selfgoverning colonies in North America to assume
a much larger share of the responsibilities and
costs of their own defence. Thus, as soon as
Westmacott and Bern completed their survey,
General Hastings Doyle, the commander-in-chief
at Halifax, asked the New Brunswick government
to provide, free of charge, land for the proposed
new batteries at Red Head and Negro Point. The
New Brunswick government did so.5
Detailed records for the construction of Red
Head and Negro Point batteries have not been
found. However, they are available for a nearly
identical project, the construction of Chapel
Point Battery at Sydney Mines, Nova Scotia.
These show that the Royal Engineers engaged
and closely supervised local contractors, and
that the progress of work was dictated by the
money available in the annual budget of the
British command at Halifax. Those funds,
allocated by the British government on the
basis of compromises among the large demands

from the whole empire, were never adequate.
The detailed correspondence for Chapel Point
Battery, concerning what work could or could
not be funded in a particular working season,
would make depressingly familiar reading for
any present-day government official or corporate
executive. It says much for the impact of the Trent
crisis, and the important role played by Saint
John in the winter reinforcement of Canada, that
even the basic structures of the Red Head and
Negro Point batteries were built.6
It was planned to mount ten heavy guns in a
dog-leg shaped position at Red Head, in groups
of two with expense magazines between each
group. Six would face east towards Partridge
Island. At the southern end of the battery, the
other four guns would angle slightly inland to
engage ships approaching the harbour from the
southeast. Clearing the heavy underbrush at the
site, an undertaking repeated by the Canadian
4 Engineer Support Regiment in April 2005
using gasoline-powered chain saws and wood
chippers, however, revealed a major problem.
The land at the southern end of the site, where
the four most seaward guns were to be installed,
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Left: The original plan for the 10-gun battery at Red Head. (“Red Head St. John NB Shewing revised site for New Battery...To
accompany C.R.E’s memo...3rd Dec 63,” courtesy of Harold Wright)
Right: A Canadian government clerk’s copy of the sketch Colonel W.F.D. Jervois made of Red Head battery during his
inspection tour of 1863. Jervois’s report resulted in the cancellation of the four gun positions (labelled here as a,b,f,e)
planned for the southern, seaward part of the battery. These positions, he argued, would be exposed to enemy fire
because of the downward slope of the ground. He also recommended the construction of a masonry, loop-holed “keep”
at “x” on the plan, and the construction of walls and ditches, shown by the dashed lines, to protect the battery from raiding
parties of infantry. “Defences of New Brunswick (St. John),” Stewart Collection, Canadian War Museum.

sloped sharply downwards. In the summer of
1863, Colonel W.F.D. Jervois, Deputy Inspector
General of Fortifications in London, visited Red
Head as part of an inspection tour of British
North America, and his report was very critical
of the site:
The work here will be isolated and unsupported,
and should certainly be capable of self-defence,
but this does not appear to have been borne
in mind in the preparation of the plan now in
progress. The five left guns of the ten proposed
to be mounted are placed on the slope of a hill
in such a manner that they would be liable to
be seen into from the high ground to the S.E. of
the battery, and even from the ground near the
beach about Cranberry Pt. I am not sure indeed
that they could not be enfiladed from the beach
[below the battery] itself. These guns on the slope
of the hill should I think be omitted – and the
left [south] flank of the battery should be close
to the summit of Red Head. This alteration will
reduce the number of guns to five or six, instead
of ten as originally proposed, and in my opinion
six guns will be quite sufficient for this site, the
intention of placing guns thereon being solely to
prevent an enemy’s ships hugging the Eastern
shore at high tide and so escaping the fire of the
guns on Partridge Island.…7

Colonel Westmacott at Halifax did not appreciate
this intervention from head office. He blamed
the local supervisor for poor implementation of
the original plan. He also observed that Jervois
attached undue importance to the danger from
landing parties, because the battery’s main
purpose was to engage enemy warships.
…that a sea Battery should be commanded or
seen into by ground adjacent or in its rear is

very general and in most cases unavoidable
by [as?] ground naturally falls towards the sea
and Batteries are placed as much in advance
as possible – the first object is to get the best
seaward range and so long as the work is not
seen into or enfiladed from sea the land question
is of little importance. In this case Cranberry Pt.
is 2000 yards distant [ie., at the very extreme
limits of small arms fire that would be the main
danger from a landing party] – but if the left of the
Battery is on the slope of the hill “dipping rapidly
towards the beach” it is evident that the Executive
Officer in charge has made an alteration and a
blunder since I first laid out the work (N.B. The
Bush then covered the site now cleared) and I
quite concur in the propriety of stopping that
side of the Battery for the present.…
Though I concur in the proposal to omit
for the present the four left guns for the reason
given, I should regret to see the original number
of ten [reduced]…the space to be covered is very
extensive and hence requires a larger Armament
than a more restricted channel.
I have replied to these remarks more fully
than I intended but it appeared desirable to
explain that the whole subject had already been
very carefully considered before advocating or
adopting any measures of defence. 8

Subsequent correspondence on the redesign
of the southern part of the battery has not
been found, but the results, carried out during
the 1864 and 1865 construction seasons, are
abundantly clear at the site. Despite Westmacott’s
appeal to rework the fortification so that the
full planned armament of ten guns could be
accommodated, only the six positions which
had been started in 1862-3 were completed.
The solution to the problem posed by the
11
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Above: The entrance to the southern expense magazine.
Note the heavy earth cover over top of the magazine.
Right: The interior of one of the expense magazines,
showing the excellent condition of the masonry. The brick
vault still looks as if it was only recently constructed.

sloping ground was dictated by economy. As a
group of University of New Brunswick students
discovered, while struggling through the dense
woods in a tour led by the authors in 2001, the
southern flank of the battery has been closed by a
towering earth mound or “traverse”. This screens
the site from both the beach below and the high
ground adjacent to the harbour approaches,
and was the cheapest way to provide the most
basic protection. Jervois, while arguing that six
guns were sufficient, had actually recommended
measures that were much more elaborate – and
expensive – to guard against landing parties:
This may be effected by constructing a tower
(with a magazine under it) at the gorge [ie in
the open area behind the gun positions], and
cutting ditches running out to the cliff. These
ditches to have in them a wall or high stockade
as an obstacle, and to be flanked from the “keep”
[the tower]. If necessary, the obstacle [ie, wall or
stockade] might also be continued along the face
of the battery, or on the slope of the cliff.9

In the event, no permanent defensive
positions guarding the rear of the battery were
ever constructed. The completed work contained
six gun positions. Five of these aim directly
towards Partridge island, effectively sealing the
eastern channel into the harbour. The sixth at
the north end, is oriented to fire into the inner
harbour. All the construction materials appear to
be local. The foundation of the gun positions was
field stone, and the general shape of the battery

was contoured with glacial till quarried just to the
north of the site. The red slate stone used to face
the gun positions is, according to locals, from a
quarry about a kilometre inland. The red brick
used to build the magazines, and the granite gun
races and facings on the magazines, were also
probably of local origin.
Jervois’ inspection tour in 1863, and another
in 1865, assessed the number and type of modern
fortifications that were necessary to defend
British North America against the United States.
Considering what the Civil War had revealed
about American military strength, Jervois’ call
for more extensive works at Red Head was
typical of his reports on the vulnerable points
on the Canadian frontier and in the Maritime
Provinces. Even the formidable citadels at Halifax
and Quebec City, built in the 1820s-40s, would
be of limited use when faced by armoured steam
warships, modern artillery, and the large infantry
and cavalry forces of the Americans. All existing
fortifications had to be supplemented or replaced
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by more heavily built works, and armed with
expensive rifled guns. Otherwise, the few tens of
thousands of British regular soldiers, and the
more numerous (but largely untrained or only
partially trained) colonial militia, would stand
no chance.
British Army estimates of the cost of modern
fortifications for Toronto, Kingston, Montreal,
Quebec City, and Saint John were in the order
of £1.6 million. This was an enormous price, the
equivalent of a multi-billion dollar undertaking
today. Saint John’s share was large, as much
as £200,000.10 A small part of that sum would
provide the tower, walls, and ditches that Jervois
recommended for Red Head. The bulk would be
needed for a substantial fort on Partridge Island,
virtually a land battleship, with guns installed
in earth-covered masonry rooms to protect the
exposed and isolated site.
The heavy financial burden of defending
British North America against the United States

played a large part in bringing the British
government strongly to support the scheme for
the confederation of the colonies promoted by the
government of the province of Canada. United,
the colonies could better muster resources for
defence. Also, a new nation that was nominally
independent from Britain, and less dependent
on British armed forces, would be less likely to
arouse the animosity of anti-British elements in
the United States. In New Brunswick, however,
such large strategic issues were submerged
in local concerns. In early 1865, the colony
elected an anti-confederation government, but
the defence issue descended the province in the
spring of 1866. Then, the Fenians, Irish-American
nationalists who were bent on the conquest of
British North America, gathered for a muchpublicized convention at Eastport, Maine near the
international border. New Brunswick mobilized
its partially organized militia, including volunteers
who assisted the small British garrison at Saint
John in guarding the port.

Photo by Lee Ellen Pottie

Detail of one side of a gun emplacement showing the cut stone revetting that strengthened the heavy earth bank. On the
right is one side of the embrasure through which the gun would have fired. Here the stone reinforcement was particularly
important to prevent erosion of the earth bank by the blast from the gun’s fire. Partridge Island is on the upper left, linked
by the breakwater to Dufferin Point, just visible on the right. Red Head’s armament was to cooperate with fire from guns
at these two positions to cover the whole of the main entrance to Saint John harbour.
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Above left: A view of a full gun emplacement, with the embrasure through which the gun fired at the centre. Partridge
Island is visible above the left hand side of the embrasure. Above right: The southern, seaward part of the battery, with
Mispec Point in the distance. This view shows how the ground of the site drops off sharply to the south. This was the
difficulty that led the Royal Engineers to cancel construction of the four southernmost gun positions planned, and erect
the large protective earth traverse clearly visible in the middle ground.

By early 1866, Red Head Battery was “threequarters” complete. This meant everything had
been finished except for the hardware necessary
to mount the guns. The battery would have looked
much as it does today, apart from the effects of
time in displacing some of the masonry, and
the erosion of the earth covering the parapets
and magazines. The most challenging task
had been the installation of the semi-circular
racers in each of the six gun positions. These
were heavy, precisely-cut, granite blocks, set on
deep foundation stones, that provided a stable,
perfectly level surface on which the wheels of the
gun platforms traversed.11 With this completed,
Red Head stood ready to receive its guns – should
the need arise.
No additional work appears to have been
carried out during the Fenian crisis of early
1866. The Fenians had no large ships, and
could threaten only small-scale raids on the
port facilities. British warships from Halifax
quickly arrived in the Bay of Fundy, carrying a
full battalion of infantry and two batteries of field
artillery. This, and the somewhat belated action
by American authorities in Maine to seize Fenian
arms caches and arrest leaders, ended the main
danger in the latter part of April 1866. One of the
results of the crisis was that the British governor,
Arthur Gordon, dismissed the anti-confederation
government, and called on pro-confederation
leaders to form a new administration. This was
a key step in achieving British British North

American confederation, and the creation of
the new Dominion of Canada on 1 July 1867.
The “staggering” cost of the mobilization of the
militia in New Brunswick to meet the crisis,
$111,853.28, helped overcome opposition to
confederation.12 Defence would henceforth be the
responsibility of the new federal government.
As part of the preparations for confederation,
the province of Canada had discussed defence
requirements with the British government.
Britain made it clear that she would soon be
greatly reducing the number of troops deployed to
protect the Canadian frontier. Canada, therefore,
agreed to implement most of Jervois’ fortification
scheme. Britain, as its part of the bargain,
spent some £200,000 from 1866 to 1872 in
constructing three massive forts on the south
shore of the St. Lawrence River to protect Quebec
City. The city was the key to the defence of the
entire Canadian interior against American attack.
Britain also spent £180,000 on an entirely new
set of coastal defence batteries at Halifax. This
was not completely unselfish. Armed with heavy
rifled guns, the forts secured the Royal Navy base
against a strike by American warships.
The new Canadian federal government agreed
to build the fortifications at the other points,
including Saint John, and in 1869 secured a
guarantee from the British government for a
loan of £1.1 million to fund the massive projects.
That same year, as part of the reduction of the
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Photo courtesy of Harold Wright.

A snapshot taken during the early part of the Second
World War that shows one of the 32-pounder smooth-bore
cannon installed at Red Head in 1878, in response to a
war scare with Russia. The guns were removed soon after
this photograph was taken in a scrap metal drive to provide
raw materials for modern munitions.

British troops that had guarded Canada during
the American Civil War, the small British garrison
left Saint John. All the land and forts were turned
over to the new federal government. Tensions
with the United States were greatly reduced by
the Treaty of Washington in 1871, and in any
case, the United States had demobilized the
forces created during the Civil War. At the end of
the year, the last British troops on the CanadaUS frontier left for home. Only 2,000 British
troops remained at Halifax to secure the imperial
fortress and dockyard.
By then, the Americans were focussing their
energies on reconstructing the South, and building
transcontinental railways for development of the
West. Canadian leaders also wanted to build a
railway from Ontario to British Columbia. This
was necessary to secure the western territories
recently acquired from the Hudson’s Bay
Company against American encroachment. The
government also had to meet its commitment
for the rail link that had persuaded British
Columbia to join Confederation. In 1873, the
British government agreed that the fortification

loan guarantee could be used to fund the Pacific
railway, and the funds to complete Red Head
battery and modernize the rest of the Saint John
defences were no longer available. Construction
of the railways ended the need for the Saint John
River route to Canada, so today, Red Head stands
as the last monument to the importance of that
communications link.
In the first decades of Confederation, Saint
John was Canada’s busiest ice-free major port.
The commercial importance of the city meant
that the new Dominion government could not
completely neglect its defence. In 1872, the
Canadian government engaged a senior British
officer, Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Selby
Smyth as “General Officer Commanding the
Militia” to help organize and administer the
Dominion’s defences. One of his big problems
was to modernize the coastal defences at a
considerably lower cost than estimated by
Jervois. Although war with the United States
looked increasingly unlikely, other potentially
hostile nations were building fleets of modern
warships. These could cross the oceans to strike
at Canada. Selby Smyth thought he had the
answer by using converted guns named after
the British inventor Sir Edward Palliser. He had
developed a process for reaming out old cast-iron
smooth-bore cannons and inserting a rifled sleeve
of tough wrought iron. This enabled the old guns
to fire modern projectiles, at a small fraction of
the cost of new rifled guns. One of Selby Smyth’s
top priorities was to arm the Saint John defences,
including Red Head, with Palliser’s guns. However,
after his first order arrived in 1875, the British
War Office discouraged the project on the grounds
that the converted guns were adequate only to
supplement, not replace, modern artillery. Only
five of the Palliser guns slated for Saint John were
delivered, and Selby Smyth had these installed
at Fort Dufferin (as Negro Point battery had been
renamed in honour of Canada’s new governorgeneral, the Earl of Dufferin.) Placing the guns
at Fort Dufferin also allowed the militia to have
easy access for training, and the site became an
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important camp for artillery units in eastern
Canada until the 1890s.
Selby Smyth was wise to worry about
threats from powers other than the United
States. During Britain’s confrontation with
Russia in 1877-8, there was good intelligence
that Russian seamen and artillery had arrived
at Ellsworth, Maine. In the event of war, they
intended to charter fast steamships and prey on
British shipping, probably in the Bay of Fundy.
The British government warned Canada that it
should not rely on British warships to protect
the coast. The British fleet would be completely
committed in countering Russia’s main naval
forces. In the spring of 1878, Selby Smyth did
his best to improve the coastal defences with the
few resources at hand. Red Head battery was
finally armed with four 32-pounder smooth-bore
cannon, which were the best guns immediately
available from Canadian stocks, but severely
outdated. In London, a special “colonial defence
committee” was created to consider the empire’s
port defences in light of the Russian threat. They
advised Canada to equip Red Head, Fort Dufferin,
and Partridge Island with heavy rifled guns, but

the estimated cost was so great that the Canadian
government dismissed this advice out of hand13.
The Russian crisis was resolved without war, and
the 32-pounders remained at Red Head, rotting
away on their wooden carriages, until they were
removed for scrap during the Second World
War.
As a result of major improvements in artillery
technology, Red Head returned to the centre
of Canadian defence planning in 1902-4. The
development of long-barrelled guns with efficient
breech-loading systems in the late nineteenth
century once again transformed naval warfare,
and consequently coastal defence. The new
guns fired high explosive shells accurately and
rapidly to ranges of 10,000 metres or more.
The Canadian government procured some of
these guns to protect the two major east coast
ports, Saint John and Quebec City. The two
heaviest guns were intended to be mounted
in large steel-reinforced concrete pits at Red
Head, and could cover all the approaches to the
port. However, before this could take place, the
British reduced their garrison at Halifax. This
forced the Canadian government, in one of its

Photo courtesy of Directorate of History and Heritage.

The two modern 7.5-inch breech-loading guns purchased by the Canadian government for Red Head in 1904. Because
of changing defence priorities they were mounted at Martinière battery, shown here in 1936, on the south shore of the
St. Lawrence River to protect the river approaches to Quebec City.
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A view of the northern part of the battery from the rear (east). In the centre is the northern expense magazine, clearly
showing how it was incorporated into a heavy earthern traverse.

rare major defence initiatives, to take over the
imperial fortress and modernize its forts with
long-barrelled breech-loaders. With Halifax
connected to central Canada by rail, and its
forts now a Dominion responsibility, Saint John
slipped significantly in the priorities for national
defence. The two big 7.5-inch guns ordered for
Red Head were instead installed in a new concrete
battery at Point Martinière, on the south shore of
the St. Lawrence River below the port of Quebec.
These guns were Quebec City’s principal seaward
defences throughout the First World War, and
most of the Second World War.14
During the First World War, Saint John
proved essential to the shipment of war supplies
to Great Britain, but the need for coastal defences
had diminished significantly. Coal-fired vessels
lacked the range and endurance to roam freely,
compared to the sailing vessels in the 1860s
and 1870s that used steam only as an auxiliary
power source. The main threat was an attack by
Germany’s long-range submarines, and against
these, small-calibre quick-firing guns and
searchlights on Partridge Island were sufficient.

However, during the 1930s, Germany
constructed large oil-fired surface warships, in
addition to re-establishing their U-boat fleet.
This left no doubt about the need to provide
more substantial defences at Canada’s east coast
ports. At the beginning of the Second World
War, the Canadian Army developed a full set of
coast artillery defences at Saint John. These,
in essence, were based on the plans made in
the 1860s-70s and early 1900s. But much had
changed, and this time technology by-passed
Red Head completely. The latest heavy guns had
ranges of 20,000 metres and more. The major
“counter-bombardment” battery was therefore
installed at Mispec Point, on the outer limit of
the harbour approaches. This was the site that
the Royal Engineers had identified as the best
position for advanced defences, should guns of
sufficient range ever be developed. In the inner
harbour, the construction of the Courtney Bay dry
dock, and the large breakwater that protected it,
had changed the defensive geography. A new inner
defence battery to cover the eastern harbour was
installed at the tip of the breakwater. However,
Red Head was developed, along with Sheldon
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Point, as a dummy gun position. Telephone poles
were pushed through the parapets, and the site
was covered with camouflage netting: the cables
and ground pegs remain on site today.
Local memories of Red Head’s military
importance persisted. In 1942, when Canada was
scrambling to complete its east coast defences in
the face of a new transatlantic German submarine
offensive, a reporter from the Saint John TimesGlobe visited Red Head:
A path, overgrown in summer with tall grasses,
leads from each gun to the powder… magazines.
Set into the side of the hill, the two stone storehouses are in almost as good condition as when
they were built, nearly a century ago.
Timothy and grasses, starred with daisies, grow
about their open doorways, but the weather-worn
stones are firmly cemented together still, and
the vaulted brickwork inside is barely touched
by time. Here and there, a white streak of mold
or a flake off the face of a brick bears witness to
the fact that the magazines have been standing
since the American North and South struggled
for supremacy.
But the scenes suggestive of war are fled, and
Red Head cows now peacefully graze upon the
spot once echoed with Canada’s former effort
preparedness for a feared invasion.15

Little had changed in the intervening 59 years
when the authors visited Red Head in 2001,
except that the cows were long gone, explaining
why the site had been completely overgrown.
The shock waves created by the American
Civil War, which brought Saint John and Red
Head into the strategic limelight in 1861-5, also
helped to produce Canadian confederation. But
nation-building quickly shunted Red Head into
the shadows. The focus of the new dominion
was transcontinental development, not maritime
affairs, and certainly not coastal defence. The
neglect caused by the shift in priorities, the
advance of military technology, and the physical
isolation of Red Head, sealed the battery in a sort
of time capsule. By contrast, Fort Dufferin, on
the foreshore of West Saint John, was an active
military site through the Second World War,
and modern structures disrupted the original
emplacements. More recently, in the 1990s, the
central part of the fort became a gravel pit, and
excavations undermined the few remaining works
from the 1860s. The other close sister of Red

Head and Fort Dufferin, Chapel Point Battery near
Sydney Mines, Nova Scotia, was abandoned in
the late 1800s. In 1940, the last remnants of the
battery were levelled to make way for a modern
fort. Only Red Head remains.
Defence is not always about fighting.
Often, it is more concerned with preparation
and deterrence. In 1777, Agreen Crabtree, a
particularly nasty privateer and pirate sailed
into the unprotected Saint John harbour and
plundered and vandalized the settlement. When
he came back the following year, Fort Howe
stood on the heights above the city, and Crabtree
turned about and never returned. None of the
fortifications at Saint John in the late nineteenth
century could have withstood a major assault.
But they were there, their presence deterred
minor raids, and a major assault would have
required considerable naval support, which
would have drawn large forces from the Royal
Navy. Red Head Battery and the other Saint John
forts served their purpose well.
No one has ever removed anything substantial
(except the granite gun races from one position)
from Red Head. Even today, the suburban
sprawl that blights the countryside around
most cities has bypassed the old battery and the
headland. The accidental preservation of the
fortifications is remarkable, and the integrity
of their historical setting on the wood-capped
bluffs more remarkable still. Red Head remains
virtually unchanged from its original form, and is
unique in Canada for its architecture. It is the site
most closely associated with the war scares with
the United States that did so much to bring about
Confederation, and it is the last guardian of the
Grand Communications Route to Canada before
the advent of the transcontinental railway.
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